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PRELIMINARY STATEMENT 
The procedural posture of the case before the court on 
appeal is as follows, Taylor National Inc. ("Taylor National"), 
the plaintiff real estate brokerage, sued defendant Jensen 
Brothers Construction Company ( "JBC") seeking to recover a 
real estate commission in the amount of $8,400.00, which Taylor 
National claimed to be due it as a commission on the sale of a 
house constructed and owned by JBC. The house was sold to 
third party defendant Leon Harward, also a real estate agent, 
in the employ of Continental Value Realty, a brokerage owned by 
third party defendants Harrison and Soule, to whom JBC claimed 
to have paid the real estate commission with the understanding 
that he would make suitable arrangements for splitting the 
commission with Taylor National, Inc., the listing realtor. 
JBC made a third party claim against Harward, Harrison 
and Soule claiming that if JBC owed a commission to Taylor 
National, third party defendants owed the same amount to JBC. 
Subsequent to the commencement of suit, JBC gave notice of 
default to Leon Harward on a Trust Deed Note which secured 
part of the purchase price of the residence and sought to 
exercise the power of sale and the Trust Deed which secured 
the Note. Harward prevailed on the court to restrain exercise 
of the :EX>Wer of sale on the Trust Deed and subsequently coun-
terclaimed against JBC seeking damages for claimed breaches of 
implied warranties in the construction of the house, for fraud 
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in allegedly failing to advise Harward that the subdivision in 
which the house was located had not been properly accepted 
by the city of Orem, and for reformation of the Trust Deed 
Note to reflect the alleged agreement by JBC that it would 
take only property in payment of the Note and not insist on 
payment in money. 
After a trial to the court, the trial court entered 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and its Judgment 
awarding Taylor National recovery against JBC for the real 
estate commission and awarding JBC recovery over against 
Harward, Harrison and Soule for the amount of the real estate 
commission. The court found for JBC and against Harward, 
no cause of action, on his counterclaims. The court stayed 
execution of Taylor National's judgment against JBC on equit-
able grounds, but allowed Taylor National to execute over 
against Harward, Harrison and Soule on JBC's third party 
judgment against them. 
On this appeal, the appellant Harward (and presumably 
Harrison and Soule), attack the court's ruling that Taylor 
National may execute over against Harward, et al., on JBC's 
third party judgment against them on the ground that Taylor 
National is not legally entitled to recover a commission from 
the buyer of a listed property, but must recover it from the 
seller. Brief of Appellant, Point II. In Point III of his 
brief, Harward apparently attacks the trial court's judgment 
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in that Taylor National was entitled a commission from JBC. 
t· 
Harward, however, does not put at issue before this court 
the trial court's judgment over against Harward, Harrison 
and Soule on JBC's third party complaint. Therefore, JBC 
does not respond in this brief to the arguments and conten-
tions contained in Points II and III of the Brief of Appellant, 
but responds only to Points IV, V, VI and VII, in which Har-
ward directly attacks the court's judgment in favor of JBC 
and against Harward on JBC's Third Party Complaint and Har-
ward's Third Party Counterclaim. 
RESPONDENT'S STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The respondent takes issue with many of the statements 
contained in the appellant's statement of facts, but because 
of the complexity of the factual context of this appeal, the 
respondent has chosen to avoid duplication by setting forth 
the facts it deems pertinent to this appeal as part of the 
argument section of its brief. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT'S JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF 
JBC AND AGAINST HARWARD, NO CAUSE OF 
ACTION, ON HIS CLAIMS OF BREACH OF IMPLIED 
WARRANTIES OF HABITABILITY AND WORKMANSHIP 
IN CONSTRUCTION OF THE HOUSE MUST BE UPHELD 
ON APPEAL. 
The trial court's judgment in favor of the Third Party 
Counterclaim defendants JBC on claims of breach of implied 
warranties in construction of the Barrington House should be 
-3-
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upheld by this court; first, because the judgment is properly 
supported by unchallenged findings of fact and second, be-
cause those findings of fact are supported by substantial 
evidence. 
A. The Trial Court's Judgment in JBC's Favor is 
Properly Supported by Unchallenged Findings 
of Fact. 
In Point IV of his Brief of Appellant, Harward attacks 
no specific Finding of Fact nor Conclusion of Law, but appar-
ently only the judgment of the trial court in favor of JBC 
and against Harward, no cause of action, as to those portions 
of Harward's Counterclaim, Crossclaim and Third Party Com-
plaint (as amended) claiming that JBC breached implied war-
ranties of habitability and workmanship in construction of 
the Barrington house. See Brief of Appellant at 74; Amended 
Judgment, paragraph 4, R. 300; Third Party Counterclaim and 
Complaint, Count 5 "Warranty of Habitability," R. 38; Amend-
ment to Third Party Complaint of Defendants Harrison, Soule 
and Harward, paragraph 19 b, R. 186-87. 
In failing to specifically challenge any particular 
finding of fact or conclusion of law, Harward is bound on 
appeal by those findings and conclusions made by the trial 
court, and the only question for review is whether they sup-
port the challenged judgment. State ex rel. New Mexico 
Water Quality Control Comm. v. City of Hobbs, 525 P.2d 371, 
-4-
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373-374 (N.M. 1974). An example of the application of this 
rule is found in Lakeside Pump & Equirnent, Inc., v. Austin 
Construction Co., 576 P.2d 392 (Wash. 1978), where both plain-
tiff and defendant in a contract dispute cross-appealed por-
tions of a judgment by challenging certain of the trial 
court's conclusions of law. The Supreme Court noted: 
In making their respective contentions, both 
parties rely heavily on factual arguments, 
quoting frequently from the trial testimony as 
to the content of the bid. Our inquiry, however, 
is narrowly limited by the failure of either 
party to assign error to the trial court's find-
ings of fact. Since no challenge was made to 
any finding of fact by either party, the trial 
court's findings became the established facts of 
the case. We must decide only whether the chal-
lenged conclusions of law are supported by the 
court's findings of fact. (Citation omitted). 
Id. at 394. The Utah Supreme Court applied a similar rule in 
Coon v. Utah Construction Co., 228 P.2d 997, 998 (Utah 1951 ). 
The issue in the instant case, therefore, is whether the 
trial court's findings of fact and conclusions of law sup-
port its judgment. See City of Hobbs, supra. 
An examination of the applicable findings shows that 
they are supportive of the court's judgment. Finding of 
Fact No. 18(e) of the Amended Findings of Fact and Conclu-
sions of Law states that: 
(e) The evidence was insufficient to find 
the Barrington House was not constructed in a 
workmanlike manner. 
-5-
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R. 291. The court also found that there was insufficient 
evidence to support Count v of Harward's Counterclaim, which 
alleged breach of an implied warranty of habitability. Find-
ing of Fact 18(f), R. 291. 
The New Mexico Supreme Court, in Horton v. Driver-Miller 
Plumbing, Inc., 414 P.2d 219 (N.M. 1966), held that a nega-
tive finding very similar to 18(e) and (f} in the instant 
case, when not challenged was conclusive on appeal. The 
case involved a claim by the plaintiff apartment-building 
owner that the defendant plumbing contractor had breached 
express and implied warranties of fitness for use, when pipes 
it had installed developed pinhole leaks after several months. 
In challenging the judgment in favor of the defendant, the 
plaintiff took exception to certain of the court's findings 
of fact but not others. The Supreme Court upheld the judg-
ment, noting as to one important unchallenged finding: 
The trial court expressly found that the 
appellants "failed to show a breach of warranty 
on the part of the defendant." This particular 
finding is not one of those which apellants spe-
cifically attacked as being unsupported by the 
evidence. A finding not specifically attacked 
and set aside by this Court is conclusive on 
appeal. (Citations omitted). 
Id. at 222. 
In the instant case, the trial court's unchallenged 
findings that there was insufficient evidence that JBC had 
breached either the warranty of habitability or of workmanship 
-6-
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in the constructon of the house are binding on appeal. Those 
findings provide ample support for the trial court's judgment 
of no cause of action on Harward's claims of breach of the 
implied warranties set forth in his Third-Party Counterclaim 
as Amended. 
Nevertheless, should the Court determine that the appro-
priate findings of fact have been put at issue in this appeal, 
the trial court's findings of fact denying any breach of im-
plied warranties is properly supported by the evidence as 
will be demonstrated below. 
B. The Trial Court's Findings of Fact are Ade-
quately Supported by the Evidence. 
Accepting, arguendo, that the doctrine of implied warran-
ties of workmanship and habitability in new construction is 
applicable under Utah law, cf., Tibbits v. Openshaw, 18 Utah 
2d 442, 425 P.2d 160, 161 (1967), the Findings of the Court 
that there is insufficient evidence in this case to support 
Harward's claims that such warranties were breached by Jensen 
Brothers should be upheld. 
1. Findings That a Party has Failed to Meet 
Its Burden of Proof in an Issue Must be 
Upheld If Reasonable Minds Could Remain 
Unconvinced That the Burden Was Met. 
The applicable standard or review of a Court's refusal 
to find that the moving party has met its burden of proof is 
set forth in Crane Co. v Dahle, 576 P.2d 870 (Utah, 1978), 
-7-
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where the Utah Supreme Court upheld the trial court's deci-
sion that the plaintiff had failed to prove its claim that 
defendants had conspired to injure its business, saying: 
We apply the standard rule of review: that 
we survey the evidence in the light most favorable 
to the trial court's findings, in this instance 
more precisely stated, his refusal to 5ind in ac-
cordance with plaintiff's contentions. 
5That where the burden of proof on an issue 
is on a party, and reasonable minds could remain 
unconvinced thereon, then the refusal of the 
court so to find must stand, see Walker Bank & 
Trust Co. vs. First Security Corp., 9 Utah 2d 215, 
341 P. 2d 944 [946 (1959)]. 
Id., at 873 and n. 5. In reviewing the trial court's 
findings that there was insufficient evidence to support 
Harward's burden of proving breach of the warranties of 
workmanship and habitability, it is necessary to briefly 
examine the elements of proof applicable to each and the 
evidence before the Court. 
2. The Tests for Breach of the Warranty of 
Habitability and the Warranty of Workman-
ship are Distinctive and Require Different 
Elements of Proof. 
In order to establish a breach of implied warranties 
in new construction, the plaintiff must prove either that 
the structure was deficient in workmanship or in habitability. 
The test for determining whether a breach has occurred is 
very different for each. 
The Supreme Court of Maine has described the standard of 
"habitability" as follows: 
-8-
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Habitability is a term difficult of precise 
definition. Every minor defect in a new home does 
not necessarily make the structure uninhabitable. 
On the other hand, the warranty should not be de-
fined in such strict terms as to require that the 
structure be deemed unlivable. • • • Whether or 
not a particular defect renders the dwelling "un-
suitable" necessarily requires inquiry as to whether 
a reasonable person faced with such a defect would 
be warranted in concluding that a major impediment 
to habitation existed. 
Banville v. Huckins, 407 A.2d 294, 297 (Me. 1979). The Court 
in Shiffers v. Cunningham Shepherd Builders Co., 470 P.2d 
593, 598 (Colo. App. 1970), described the test for breach 
of the warranty of workmanlike construction as follows: 
For construction to be done in a good and 
workmanlike manner, there is no requirement of per-
fection; the test is reasonableness in terms of 
what the workman of average skill and intelligence 
(the conscientious worker) would ordinarily do. 
See Wimmer v. Down East Properties, Inc. 406 A.2d 88 (Me. 
1979) (Implied warranty in construction of new home that 
work would be done in a reasonably skillful and workmanlike 
manner.) 
There is a distinct difference in the nature of the 
liability concept applicable to each warranty. Breach of 
the warranty of habitability is based on strict liability, 
i.e., "[n]egligence, knowledge, or fault of the vendor [of 
the house] need not be shown" (Matalunas v Baker 569 S.W.2d 
791, 794 (Mo. App. 1978)),. but only that the house has some 
major impediment to habitation. A breach of the warranty 
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of workmanship, however, requires, by its very nature, some 
default on the part of the builder. This warranty is closely 
analogous to, if not identical with, the warranty implied 
in a personal services contract that the services will be 
performed in a workmanlike manner. The Idaho Supreme Court 
held in Hoffman v. Simplot Aviation, Inc., 539 P.2d 584 (Id. 
1975), that breach of such an implied warranty could not be 
based on strict liability, but that fault must be shown: 
The more vexing problem of theory is the dis-
tinction, if any, between the doctrines of implied 
warranty and negligence in circumstances involving 
the rendering of personal services. Although such 
causes of action are generally thought to be inde-
pendent of each other in the instant circumstances 
they merge into one cause of action. A fundamental 
component in a negligence action is the existence 
of a duty ••• toward another and a breach thereof. 
In circumstances involving the rendition of personal 
services the duty upon the actor is to perform the 
services in a workmanlike manner. 
* * * 
"Whether the tort standard of care is con-
sidered or the duty of care imposed by an 
implied warranty of workmanlike perfor-
mance is taken as the applicable standard, 
in our view the resultant standard of care 
required ••• is identical •••• " (Cita-
tions omitted.) 
Id. at 589. The Court concluded that: 
Since the case involved the rendition of 
personal service, a cause of action does not exist 
for breach of an implied warranty in the absence 
of fault on the part of the actor. 
Id. at 590. See, In Re Talbott's Estate, 337 P.2d 986, 989 
(Kan. 1959) ("A breach of an implied warranty. • • to do a 
-10-
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y 
workmanlike job usually results from negligence or failure to 
use due care and skill in performing the particular work.") 
The evidence presented at trial, viewed in the light 
most favorable to the trial court's findings (as it must be) 
supports the conclusion that reasonable minds could remain 
unconvinced that JBC breached implied warranties in construe-
tion of the house. A discussion of the evidence follows. 
3. The Trial Court was Justified in Its 
Refusal to Find that JBC Breached the 
Warranty of Habitability Because Har-
ward Presented No Evidence of a Major 
Impediment to Habitation. 
Unlike the instant case, in cases relied on by Harward 
as examples of breaches of the warranty of habitability, 
there was evidence in the record of major impediments to 
habitability and findings by the respective courts that the 
dwellings were in some way unfit for habitation due to de-
fects. For example, in House v. Thornton, 457 P.2d 199 (Wash. 
1969), there was evidence that settling of the soil had re-
sulted in cracks in the foundation and other parts of the 
house so severe that daylight showed through. In spite of 
efforts by both owner and builder to remedy the situation, 
both parties evidently agreed that "the house was untenable 
and unfit for further occupancy as a dwelling." Id., at 201. 
The Washington Supreme Court held that such evidence sup-
ported the trial court's finding that the house was "unusable 
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as a dwelling" and upheld judgment in favor of plaintiffs. 
Id. at 203. 
In Mulhern v. Hederich, 430 P.2d 470 (Colo. 1967), the 
trial court had entered specific findings to the effect that 
"heaving'' of the foundation had made the basement of the 
house "uninhabitable" in that it "could not be used for the 
purposes for which it had been designed, namely the division 
thereof into rooms for use by members of the family." When 
combined with other construction defects the total damage 
award was $3,500, fully 15 percent of the total cost of the 
house, $25,000. The Colorado Supreme Court upheld the judg-
ment noting that it would not disturb a judgment predicated 
on findings of the trial court on disputed questions of fact. 
Id. at 470. The evidence before the trial court in the in-
stant case did not rise to this level. 
At trial, Mr. Harward produced two witnesses who testi-
f ied as to problems which had developed in the house and 
introduced photographs illustrating those problems. Exhibits 
44(A)-(K). The first, Jim Loveland, a contractor of one 
year's experience, testified that the foundation was settling 
at a rate faster than normal, resulting in the following 
problems: 
1. Cracks in the garage floor which appear to 
be merely cosmetic. R. at 581; Ex. 44(A). 
2. A horizontal crack in a sheetrock wall, of 
which there was evidence that it could have 
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been caused by a large rack affixed to the 
wall by Harward and holding a number of 
bridles and other horse tack. R. at 581-82, 
587-88, 655; Ex. 44{B). 
3. A slight shift {apparently about 5/8") in 
a wall in the family room which contains 
the fireplace. R. 582-83, 595; Ex. 44{C) 
and (D). "This is the room that shows the 
most movement." R. 582. 
4. Some damage to a concrete frame surrounding 
a grate-covered opening in the rear of the 
house. R. 583; Ex. 44(F). 
5. A doorframe which shifted out of square. 
R. 5 8 3; Ex. 4 4 { G) and { H) • 
6. Slight separation at the juncture of two 
walls in one corner of the family room. 
R. 584; Ex. 44(!). (Cracks are barely 
visible in photograph.). 
7. A crack, approximately 1/2" by 2', in the 
exterior brick above a door. R. 584; Ex. 
4 4 { J ) and ( K ) • 
All the problems described apparently occurred in one section 
of the ground floor of the two-story structure containing the 
garage and family room. R. 587. Harward's second witness, 
Jack Potter, also a contractor, merely reviewed the photo-
graphs and stated he had seen the areas of the house they 
depicted. R. 590-95. 
Mr. Loveland estimated the cost of repair to be $5,602.31. 
R. 776. There was no testimony that this estimate was reason-
able or that the items comprising the estimate were reasonably 
necessary repairs. Mr. Leon Jensen, vice-president of JBC 
and an experienced builder with 12 years of cost estimating 
experience, took exception to Mr. Loveland's estimate both 
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as to the necessity for certain repairs and the reasonable-
ness of the cost. He testified that $2,000 would be a rea-
sonable charge to correct the problems in the house. R. 
407-12. Cf. Hellbaum v. Burwell and Morford, 463 P.2d 225, 
231, (Wash. App. 1969). ("Proof of mere expenditure does 
not establish that the expenditure was reasonably necessary 
or reasonable in amount.") 
The purchase price of the house was $140,000. Accepting 
the $2,000 figure as the reasonable cost of repair (which the 
trial court was entitled to do and obviously did in this case 
[see Conclusion of Law No. 9 R. 296] ), then the cost of repair-
ing the problems complained of was only 1.5 percent of the 
total value of the house--a far cry from the 15 percent figure 
in Mulhern v. Hederich, supra, relied on by Mr. Harward. 
Mr. Jensen further testified on cross examination that 
the damage which occurred from settling of the foundation 
was not significant. R. 763-64. There was no testimony from 
which it could be inferred that the problems complained of 
in the house made the house unfit for the purpose for which 
it was purchased, nor that such problems were a major impedi-
ment to habitability. 
Certainly on this facts there was room for reasonable 
men to doubt that the house contained major impediments to 
habitability and the trial court's conclusion that Mr. Har-
ward had not met his burden of proof on his claim of breach 
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of the warranty of habitability must therefore be sustained. 
4. The Trial Court's Finding That There Was 
Insufficient Evidence That The House Was 
Not Constructed in a Workmanlike Manner 
Is Also Supported by the Evidence. 
As noted earlier, in order to prove breach of the war-
ranty of workmanship, there must be some evidence of fault or 
negligence on the part of the builder. Cases in which courts 
have found breaches of an implied warranty of workmanlike 
construction, including those cited in the Harward Brief, 
rely on evidence that defects were the result of improper 
or faulty construction techniques. See, e.g., Pollard v. 
Saxe & Yolles Development Co., 525 P.2d 88, 90 (Cal. 1974) 
(floor damage caused by use of undersized beams inadequate 
for support, improper materials increased stress on floors); 
Belt v. Spencer, 585 P.2d 972 (Colo. App. 1978) (cracked 
foundation and walls due to improper installation of drainage 
system, improper grade, and improper installation of floor 
and driveway slab); Carpenter v. Donohoe, 388 P.2d 399 (Colo. 
1964) (walls cracked to the point of cave-in due to construe-
tion which violated county building codes). 
The testimony of Mr. Loveland, Harward's contractor, was 
that there was some greater than normal subsidence in the 
foundation of the house. R. 580-81. There was absolutely no 
evidence presented that this subsidence was due to any sub-
standard workmanship or negligent construction on the part of 
the builder, JBC. In fact, Mr. Potter, a builder testifying 
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for Mr. Harward admitted on cross examination that in his 
experience foundation cracks do appear without any negligence 
on the part of the builder. R. 596. 
Mr. Clarence Perry, an experienced excavator, testified 
for JBC that he was employed to excavate the foundation of 
the Harward house, that the soil was excavated with a hydro-
unit, the best method for problem soil, and that the excava-
tion was done without mistakes and in original soil, which 
would normally does not require compaction. R. 639-642. 
Mr. Leon Jensen, an officer of JBC who had previously super-
vised the pouring of over 100 foundations, testified that 
JBC nevertheless did compact the soil after excavation, an 
unusual extra step taken to ensure that the house would be 
well constructed. R. 754-56. 
Further, it is clear that the Court had some doubts 
after the testimony of Harward's witnesses, Loveland and 
Potter, whether the problems in the house were defects or 
due to defective workmanship. R. 597, lines 21-24. These 
doubts could well have resulted from the fact that Hrward 
presented no testimony of any accepted standard from which 
wormanship or lack thereof could be judged. Even if there 
were some defects: 
The builder-vendor is not required to construct a 
perfect house. The test is one of reasonableness of 
quality. 
Matalunas v. Baker, supra at 794. 
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Certainly on the record before the trial court, reason-
able minds could remain unconvinced that Mr. Harward had 
carried his burden of proof that JBC had breached a warranty 
of workmanship in the construction of the house and the 
Court's findings and judgment in that regard must therefore 
be sustained. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT'S JUDGMENT THAT HARWARD HAD 
NO CAUSE OF ACTION IN FRAUD AGAINST JBC FOR 
ITS ALLEGED FAILURE TO DISCLOSE CERTAIN FACTS 
ABOUT THE STATUS OF SUBDIVISION IMPROVEMENTS 
MUST BE UPHELD BECAUSE IT IS SUPPORTED BY A 
PROPER FINDING OF FACT WHICH IS ITSELF SUP-
PORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE. 
A. The Trial Court's Unchallenged Finding That JBC 
Committed No Actionable Fraud Fully Supports 
The Court's Judgment that Harward had no Cause 
Of Action in Fraud Against JBC. 
In Point v of his brief, Harward again does not attack 
any specific finding of the trial court, but argues generally 
that the trial court's judgment that Harward had no cause of 
action in fraud against JBC is in error because JBC was guilty 
of fraud in failing to notify Harward prior to his purchase 
of the house that the subdivision improvements had not been 
physically accepted by the City of Orem. Harward Brief at 
84. As discussed earlier, where the Court's findings are 
not specifically attacked, they are conclusive on appeal 
and the only question is whether they support the judgment. 
In Finding of Fact 18(a), the trial court specifically found: 
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JBC 
R. 290. 
(a) 
• • • 
There was no actionable fraud by 
as alleged in Count I. 
As the gravamen of count I of the Third Party Counterclaim 
against JBC sounds in fraud, the court's finding that there 
was no fraud amply supports paragraph 4 of the Amended Judg-
rnent in which the court ruled against Harward and in favor of 
JBC, no cause of action, on all issues in the Counterclaim, 
Crossclaim and Third Party Complaint. R. 300. 
In any event, it is clear that there was substantial 
evidence on which the court could have based its finding that 
no fraud had occurred and the necessary inference to be drawn 
from that finding that Harward failed to meet his burden 
of producing "clear and convincing" evidence on each essen-
tial element of fraud. Beckendorf v. Beckendorf, 457 P.2d 
603, 607-07 (Wash. 1969). 
B. There is Substantial Evidence in the Record 
Which Supports the Trial Court's Finding That 
JBC Committed no Actionable by Fraud. 
In reviewing attacks on specific findings of the trial 
court: 
[T]his court is constrained to look at the whole 
of the evidence in the light favorable to the 
trial court's findings, including any fair in-
ferences to be drawn from the evidence and.all 
of the circumstances shown. The trial court's 
findings shall not be disturbed unless the evi-
dence is such that all reasonable minds would be 
persuaded to the contrary. (Footnotes omitted.) 
Hanover Ltd. v. Fields, 568 .2d 751, 753 (Utah 1977). The 
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burden for overturning a trial court's findings should be even 
more stringent where the appellant's burden at trial was to 
produce clear and convincing evidence of fraud. It is clear 
in the instant case that Harward did not meet that burden 
at trial. 
The allegations set forth in his Third Party Counter-
claim show the nature of the fraud that Harward sought to 
prove. In Count I, Harward alleged that at the time that 
he purchased the house, the subdivision in which the house 
was built had not been approved by the city of Orem as re-
quired by law. He further alleged that JBC knew that the 
subdivision had not been approved and knowingly failed to 
disclose this information to Harward, who justifiably relied 
on such nondisclosure in purchasing the property. Harward 
alleges that he was injured by such nondisclosure because 
failure to obtain municipal approval of a subdivision results 
in the property being left without public services such as 
fire protection, snow removal, street repair and police pro-
tection, leaving Harward with a house of dirn~nished value 
which could not be sold until the subdivision was approved. 
He seeks damages in the amount of $250,000.00. Third party 
counterclaim and Complaint, paragraphs 10 through 17, R. 35-36. 
It should be noted that JBC was not the subdividor but 
had merely built the Barrington House on a lot owned by Tay-
lor National, Inc., the plaintiff in this case. R. 7-8; 12-13. 
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At trial the official plat of the subject subdivision, 
Executive Estates, plat C, was introduced in evidence as 
Exhibit 26. The plat map shows that it was accepted by the 
legislative body, the City Council of Orem, on January 4, 1977: 
The City Council of Orem, County of Utah, approves 
this subdivision and hereby accepts the dedication 
of all streets •••• 
It was filed with the Utah County Recorder on February 22, 
1977. This acceptance and recordation of the plat occurred 
several months before the house was sold to Harward. Ex. 24, 
Earnest Money Receipt and Offer to Purchase, dated October 
27, 1977. 
There was testimony by John w. Jones, Director of Pub-
lie Works of the City of Orem that after a subdivision has 
been accepted and properly recorded the lots may built upon, 
subject only to the building permit process. R. 576. There 
was no claim that JBC failed to obtain a proper building 
permit. Mr. Jones, subject to JBC's objection as to materi-
ality (R573, lines 18-23), also described the official ap-
proval process necessary to accomplish the subdivision of 
land within the city of Provo. He noted that one of the 
conditions precedent to recording the plat is that the sub-
divider file a performance bond ensuring the proper instal-
lation of off-site improvements,including streets, sewer, 
curb, gutter sidewalk, etc. R. 574-75. Although the plat 
can be approved and filed at that time, he testified that 
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the street improvements "are not accepted until such time 
as they are installed properly and the final inspections 
are made." R. 575. Mr. Jones testified that this final accep-
tance occurred on October 15, 1979. There was no testimony 
from any witness that because the improvements were not ac-
cepted, the subdivision was not provided with police and 
fire protection, sewer and other services as alleged in the 
Third Party Counterclaim. Clearly the subdivision approval 
discussed in the Harward counterclaim relates to approval 
of the plat and not to approval of the physical improvements 
as installed in the subdivision. On that basis JBC's objec-
tion on grounds of relevance and materiality was well taken 
and further testimony in that regard was probably not con-
sidered by the trial court and should not be considered by 
this court. 
In any event, Harward simply did not present sufficient 
evidence on the elements required for proof of fraud. Accept-
ing the elements of fraud as set forth in Stuck v Delta Land 
and Water Company 227 P. 791, 795 (Utah 1924) as quoted at 
page 75 of the Harward Brief, Harward failed in his proof 
as follows: 
(1) There was no representation made about the improve-
ments by JBC. There is no evidence in the record that any 
representative of JBC made any representation or statement 
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about subdivision improvements; in fact, there is no evidence 
these improvements were even discussed before the sale of 
the house. In his brief Harward apparently recognizes this 
problem and attempts to develop a concept of fraudulent non-
disclosure. Harward Brief at 75-77. According to Harward's 
own authorities, however, silence only becomes actionable 
where there is a duty to disclose material facts on the part 
of one of the parties. Such a duty simply did not exist 
in the instant case. There was no confidential or fiduciary 
relationship between the parties. There was no inequality 
in condition or knowledge between the parties: Although 
JBC was an experienced homebuilder, Leon Harward was himself 
an experienced professional real estate salesman (R. 629) 
with undoubtedly equal knowledge as to laws, customs and 
practices relating to the approval of subdivisions and sub-
division improvements. Nor was there any evidence that 
JBC had knowledge that Harward was acting under the mistaken 
belief that the subdivision improvements had not been physi-
cally approved by the city, or that Harward was relying on 
JBC for such information. The sale of the house was an arm's 
length transaction between an equally sophisticated buyer 
and seller. 
(2) There was no knowledge on the part of JBC of the 
falsity of any representation. Even if the court could have 
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found that there was a representation or an actionable non-
disclosure, there is no evidence of any kind in the record 
which indicates that JBC or anyone associated with JBC knew 
that the subdivision improvements had not been finally physi-
cally accepted by the city of Orem. 
(3) There is no evidence that any alleged false repre-
sentation was material. It is apparent that the subdivision 
improvements were at least visually acceptable to Harward 
at the time that he bought the house because he in fact did 
go through with the deal; there is no evidence in the record 
that there was anything wrong with those improvements at 
the time of the transaction. Given that fact and the further 
fact that there was a performance bond ensuring that the 
improvements to be properly installed it is difficult to 
see how a buyer would be materially affected in his decision 
whether to make a deal by knowledge that the subdivision 
improvements had not been physically accepted by the city. 
In fact the performance bond evidently did insure that the 
problems which subsequently occurred with the improvements 
were satisfactorily taken care of by October 1979. R. 
576-77, 604. 
(4) Harward did not prove he was damaged by an alleged 
misrepresentation. The testimony relating to Harward's 
inability to sell the house is at best equivocal and was 
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met with some doubt by the judge at the time it was given. 
R. 656-57. It consists almost entirely of testimony that 
the subdivision improvements were in visibly bad condition, 
that at the time of trial there were seven houses on the 
block for sale (there is no evidence of how many houses had 
been for sale prior to the time of trial), and that during 
the past year or two only one house had been sold on the 
block. R 656-58. Harward testified that he believed he 
could not get $140,000 for the house, but on cross-examina-
tion it was shown tht he had listed the house for sale at 
$150,000 and had never tried to sell it for $140,000. R. 
714-16. The court was certainly justified in assuming that 
there were other equally possible causes for the failure 
of houses in the subdivision to sell besides the street con-
ditions. 
In summary, Harward failed to present evidence neces-
sary to sustain several important elements which he was re-
quired to prove by clear and convincing evidence in order 
to establish fraud on the part of JBC. There was substan-
tial evidence to support the trial court's finding that there 
was no fraud, and its judgment of no cause of action based 
on that finding should be sustained by this court. 
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c. Harward's Assertion on Appeal that there was 
Negligent Misrepresentation as to the Status of 
the Subdivision Improvements is not Properly 
Before this Court as it was Never a Part of 
His Claim Below. 
It should be mentioned that Harward also apparently 
claims in his brief that the trial court should have found 
that there was at least a negligent misrepresentation as 
to the status of the improvements vis a vis Orem City. How-
ever, Harward never made any claims of negligent misrepresen-
tation in his original Third Party Counterclaim, nor was 
there any amendment made or requested to that effect. In 
Ellis v Hale, 373 P.2d 382 (Utah 1962), this Court held, 
in upholding the lower court's dismissal of a complaint 
alleging fraud, that: 
In plaintiff's complaint it is specifically 
alleged that the defendants had knowledge of the 
falsity of the supposed representation that in-
duced the belief that the lots were part of an 
approved subdivision. We conclude that this 
knowledge forecloses an action for negligent 
misrepresentation ••• 
Id. at 385. In other words, Howard cannot claim in his 
counterclaim that JBC knew the subdivision had not been prop-
erly approved, and then, in his brief attacking the court's 
finding that there was no fraud, allege that if JBC didn't 
know, it should have known. The claims are mutually exclu-
sive and an allegation of negligent misrepresentation should 
not be allowed to be made for the first time at trial or 
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on this appeal. Moreover, the evidence presented to the 
trial court, as discussed above, simply does not supi;x>rt 
a claim of negligent misrepresentation on the part of JBC, 
as JBC made no representation at all regarding the status 
of the improvements. 
POINT IV 
HARWARD PROVED NONE OF HIS CLAIMED DEFENSES 
TO ENFORCEMENT OF THE TRUST DEED, AND THE TRIAL 
COURT'S JUDGMENT THAT THE TRUST DEED NOTE 
WAS IN DEFAULT AND THAT THE TRUST DEED BE 
FORECLOSED MUST THEREFORE BE SUSTAINED. 
A. The Trial Court's Finding that there was no 
Meeting of the Minds Between Harward and JBC 
Requiring JBC to Accept Solely Property in 
Payment of the Trust Deed Note Supports its 
Judgment Enforcing the Trust Deed Note by 
Allowing Sale of the Trust Deed Property. 
In Points VI and VII of his Brief, Harward evidently 
contests the judgment of the trial court that the Harwards 
are in default in payment of the Trust Deed Note and that 
JBC may cause the trustee to sell the property secured by 
the Trust Deed (Amended Judgment, paragraph 5, R. 300-301) 
and its judgment denying reformation of the Trust Deed as 
requested in Harward's Amendment to Third Party Complaint. 
Amendment, paragraph 18, R. 186; Amended Judgment, paragraph 
4, R. 300. Harward's arguments as to both points revolve 
around the related claims that JBC agreed to take land in 
trade for the amount owing on the Trust Deed Note, that JBC 
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is estopped from denying that it agreed to take land in 
trade, and that the Trust Deed Note should be reformed to 
reflect this agreement. 
Again, Harward has attacked the judgment of the trial 
court without attacking its specific findings of fact. Thus, 
the court's findings are conclusive on appeal, and, if they 
support the judgment, it must be upheld. The finding of 
fact applicable to this issue is Finding of Fact 18(d): 
(d) The evidence was insufficient to compel or 
justify any reformation of the Trust Deed or Trust 
Deed Note (Exhibit 59) acknowledged by Leon Harward 
as executed and delivered to JBC with respect to the 
Bartington House, and the court specifically finds 
that no meeting of the minds occurred between Leon 
Harward or Judith Harward, his wife, with JBC per-
taining to acceptance of property or sales of real 
estate in lieu of the cash required pursuant to 
terms of the Trust Deed Note. 
The remedy of reformation is available to a party who 
proves that due to mutual mistake or fraud or inequitable 
conduct on the part of another party, the written contract 
between them fails to reflect their agreement. Ingram v. 
Forrer, 563 P.2d 181, 182 (Utah 1977); George v. Fritsch 
Loan & Trust Co., 256 P. 400, 403 (Utah 1924). The thresh-
hold question is whether there was an initial agreement to 
which the writing may be conformed. The trial court's find-
ing that there was no meeting of the minds between the var-
ious parties as to acceptance of property in lieu of cash, 
together with its finding that the Harwards had no defense 
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to enforcement of the Trust Deed and Trust Deed Note (Find-
ing of Fact 19(g) R. 293) fully support those parts of the 
trial court's Amended Judgment which relate to enforecement 
of those instruments. 
Should this court decide that the trial court's findings 
are properly attacked on review it must still uphold those 
findings and the resulting judgment on the ground that they 
are amply supported by the evidence, as will be demonstrated 
below. 
B. The Trial Court's Finding that there was no 
Agreement by JBC to Accept only Property in 
Payment of the Trust Deed Note is Fully Supported 
by the Evidence and Harward Failed to Adequately 
Prove his Defenses to Enforcement of the Note 
and the Trust Deed. 
Although it is the duty of this court to review the 
facts as well as the law in reviewing an equity proceeding, 
such as the instant, involving application of the equitable 
remedies of estoppel and reformation of an instrument, the 
court has imposed some bounds on its scope of review. As 
the court stated in Del Porta v. Nicolo, 495 P.2d 811, 812 
(Utah 1972): 
It is true, as plaintiff asserts, that this 
action to avoid deeds is one in equity upon which 
this court has both the prerogative and the duty to 
review and weigh the evidence, and to determine the 
facts. However, in the practical application of 
that rule it is well established in our decisional 
law that due to the advantaged position of the trial 
court, in close proximity to the parties and the 
witnesses, there is indulged a presumption of cor-
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rectness of his findings and judgment, with the 
burden upon the appellant to show they were in 
error; and where the evidence is in conflict, we 
do not upset his findings merely because we may 
have reviewed the matter differently, but do so 
only if the evidence preponderates against them. 
(Footnotes omitted.) 
See Foster v. Blake Heights Corp., 530 P.2d 815, 816 (Utah 
1974). This must be particularly true where the evidence 
required to sustain plaintiff's burden of persuasion is re-
quired to be both clear and convincing, as in the instant 
case where the doctrines of equitable estoppel and reforma-
tion of instruments are invoked. Tribble v. Reely, 557 P.2d 
813, 818 (Mont. 1976) ("[E]stopppel is not favored and will 
only be sustained upon clear and convincing evidence."); 
Weight v. Bailey, 147 P. 899, 903 (Utah 1915) ("[T]he pre-
surnption that the instrument correctly evidences the agree-
ment of the parties, where reformation is resisted, must be 
overcome by proof which is clear and convincing.") 
Harward's assertion that there was mutual mistake 
justifying reformation of the Trust Deed Note to reflect 
JBC's alleged agreement to take land in lieu of cash in pay-
rnent and that JBC is estopped from denying that there was 
such an agreement will be discussed in turn below. 
1. There was Insufficient Evidence of 
Mutual Mistake to Justify Reformation 
of the Trust Deed Note. 
Reformation of a written contract on grounds of mistake 
requires that the mistake "be mutual, and that both parties 
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understood the contract as the complaint or petition alleges 
it ought to have been, and as in fact it was except for the 
mistake. II Ingram, supra at 182 (Emphasis by the court). • • • 
Evidence of mutual mistake must be "clear and convincing": 
An honest difference of understanding as to what the 
contract was is fatal to reformation, for in such case 
there is no meeting of the minds of the parties and 
no preexisting agreement to which the written instru-
ment can be conformed. 
It is often stated that reformation will not be granted 
on [internally] contradictory evidence. (Footnote 
omitted.) 
Id. See 66 Arn Jur 2d, "Reformation of Instruments", S 125. 
The evidence before the court on Harward's claim that JBC 
agreed to accept property, and not money, in payment of the 
Trust Deed Note was at best contradictory and simply did 
not reach the level of "clear and convincing". 
Harward prepared two Earnest Money Receipts offering 
to purchase the Barrington House from JBC. The first (Exhi-
bit 60) contains a provision that $56,600 of the price of 
the house will be "equity in ground". That Earnest Money 
was signed by Harward, but was not accepted by JBC. R. 
732-33, 746. Leon Jensen, an officer of JBC, testified that 
the unsigned Earnest Money was rejected by JBC because the 
provision for trading of equity in ground for a portion of 
the purchase price was not acceptable. R. 732-35. The 
Earnest Money Receipt subsequently signed by both parties 
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(Exhibit 24) contained no provision that land or equity in 
land would be accepted as a portion of the purchase price. 
That Earnest Money bears the date of October 27, 1977. 
The next day, on October 28, 1977, the Harwards signed 
a Trust Deed Note to JBC for $45,600 (Exhibit 59) represent-
ing a portion of the down payment on the property, and to 
secure the Trust Deed Note a Trust Deed of the same date 
was executed {Exhibit 45). The Trust Deed Note provides 
that the principal amount will be paid "in full on or before 
May 1, 1978" and shows no indication that any provision is 
1 
made for payment in other than money. 
Harward testified that when he first spoke with Leon 
Jensen about acquiring the Barrington House with Leon Jensen, 
they discussed the nature of the consideration to be paid: 
A. I asked Leon if they would be interested in taking 
ground as a down payment. 
Q. Were you given an answer to that question? 
A. They would entertain it, they would talk about 
it. 
Q. Are you telling us what Mr. Leon Jensen said? 
A. Yes. He said that they would consider it and take 
a look at it. 
1 
"Unless the parties agree otherwise, or an obligee consents 
to receive some other medium, payment of an obligation may 
be made only in money." 60 Am Jur 2d "Payment," §22. 
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R. 613. Mr. Harward testified that subsequently, from early 
October or November until the next spring (both before and 
after signing the Earnest Money, according to him) he took 
Leon and Marvin Jensen of JBC to look at several parcels 
of property. R. 614-621. Leon Jensen contradicts Harward's 
claim that there was any discussion of accepting property 
in lieu of cash until after the Earnest Money and the Trust 
Deed Note were signed. R. 736. Only three of the approxi-
mately twelve parcels which Harward testifies he showed to 
Jensen were shown to them prior to the due date of the Note, 
May 1, 1978. R. 718-719. It is apparent from Harward's 
testimony that he did not own any of the property (see R. 
614-621), but was attempting to interest the Jensens in buy-
ing property belonging to others on which he would receive a 
real estate commission. R. 673, 737-739. It is also clear 
that during the entire period in which Leon Harward was show-
ing property to the Jensens, the Jensens were also looking at 
other property with other realtors because they needed a 
project to develop at that time. R. 742. 
The Jensens' testimony was very specific that they 
expected the Note to be paid in money, but were willing to 
take land if suitable land could be produced for them by 
Mr. Harward: 
A. [Leon Jensen] Yes. We discussed the possibility 
of taking property in exchange for this Trust Deed 
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* * * 
and Notes. If there were some presented that were 
acceptable and it was feasible •.•• 
Q. Okay. And who was present? 
A. Leon Harward and myself. 
Q. And what was said? 
A. He asked me if we would consider taking the prop-
erty that he had in exchange for all or part of 
the down payment for that home. 
Q. And what did you say? 
A. I said we'd consider it. 
Q. • • • Were you required to do so in your under-
standing? 
A. No. 
R. 736. 
Q. (By Mr. Norton} ••• From the time the Trust Deed 
Note was signed, Exhibit 45, to this time, have 
you or to your knowledge any other agent of Jensen 
Brothers Construction agreed to accept land and 
not to require cash in payment of the Trust Deed 
Note? 
A. [Marvin Jensen] Absolutely not. 
R. 748. Leon Jensen testified that at the signing of the 
Trust Deed Note and again at the closing on the house Harward 
told him that when the Note was due "if he had to he would 
take out a second mortgage on his home or some other prop-
erty he had and pay us in cash." R. 735. 
Further, at least twice before the May 1, 1978, due 
date on the Trust Deed Note, Marvin Jensen, president of 
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JBC, called Harward to adivse him that JBC expected to be 
paid on the Note. R. 400-403. 
The Jensens continued to consider accepting equity in 
property or some sort of property deal for the amount of 
the Note after the May 1, 1978, due date because of their 
feeling that it would be difficult to otherwise collect from 
Harward. As Leon Jensen testified: 
A. You are asking me what attempts I know of to col-
lect the money? 
Q. Yes. 
A. Leon Harward and I had several conversations in 
which I, this was at or around the time of the 
Trust Deed and Note being due, I had several con-
versations about that; and I informed him of our 
desire to collect on that, it was becoming due 
and we didn't want the thing to drag on, that we 
wanted to collect. 
Q. What was his response? 
A. He assured me that there would be no problem. 
Q. After May of 1978, there was a reason why you--were 
there reasons why you allowed him to show you prop-
erty? 
A. Yes. It was obvious to us and he, I think, very 
well, I think it was very soon after the Note be-
came due he told me that he just did not have the 
funds to pay the Note off. And the reason why we 
still considered property in exchange is to col-
lect somehow on the Note. 
R. 741-743. 
In an attempt to consummate some sort of deal by which 
they could be paid out of the now over-due Note, the Jensens 
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ultimately, in November of 1978, entered into an Earnest 
Money Agreement with parties known as Memmott and Johnson 
on a 25-acre parcel (the Williamson property) shown to them 
by Harward. As part of the deal, Memmott and Johnson were 
to accept the Trust Deed Note as a portion of the purchase 
price. Exhibit 38. In his Brief at pages 90-92 Harward 
argues that this proves that JBC had agreed to accept land 
in trade for equity. It does prove that JBC had agreed, 
in the context of that deal, to accept land, but not that 
JBC was obligating itself to accept only land and not money. 
In fact a letter quoted by Harward at page 91 of his Brief 
indicated that this was merely an accommodation to Harward 
and not an indication of some binding agreement: 
The arrangements to include your Note in this deal on 
Williamson's property should be a benefit to both of 
us. It is, as you know, because of these negotiations 
that we have held off on our foreclosure of your home. 
Exhibit 55. The "Williamsen deal" was never closed for rea-
sons not before the court in this matter. R. 762. 
The only evidence presented by Harward wnich appears 
to support his contention that JBC agreed to accept only 
property in satisfaction of the Trust Deed Note besides his 
own rather ambiguous testimony was a pre-closing letter to 
Scott Harrison of American Home Mortgage, Inc., the institu-
tion financing the bulk of Harward's purchase of the Barring-
ton House, and signed by Leon Jensen, indicating that JBC 
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had taken equity in property which Mr. Harward owned as a 
down payment on the house. Exhibit 37. This evidently re-
sulted in the Settlement Statement (Exhibit 36}, indicating 
that part of the consideration for the sale was a "Land Trade" 
in the amount of $56,600. It is clear, however, that this 
letter was written by JBC at the specific request of Leon 
Harward. Mr. Harward, in fact, so testified: 
Q. (By Mr. Norton} I show you what's previously 
been marked and offered as Exhibit 37, proporting 
to be a letter from Leon Jensen to Scott Harrison. 
Do you remember seeing that letter? 
A. Yes, I do. 
Q. And that letter was written at your request, wasn't 
it? 
A. Yes. 
Q. You knew at the time that property had not been 
transferred to Jensen Brothers? 
A. I knew that they had not received property yet, 
yes. 
Q. But you requested Leon Jensen to write that letter? 
A. I asked him if he would. 
Q. And the reason for that is so that you could obtain 
that first mortgage? 
A. That's true. 
R. 708. 
Thus, it is clear from the evidence that the trial court 
was justified in concluding that there was never a binding 
agreement that JBC would accept only property in satisfaction 
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of the Trust Deed Note. In fact, the evidence which Harward 
cites in Point VI of his Brief as supportive of his position 
that there was such an agreement is equally persuasive evi-
dence of JBC's agreement to merely accommodate him by accept-
ing property because of his lack of funds to pay the Trust 
Deed Note in cash. To the extent other testimony appears 
to contradict this, the court may "assume that [the trial 
court] believed those aspects of the evidence which are in 
accord with his findings and judgment." Foster v. Blake 
Heights Corporation, supra at 816. 
Even if the evidence were sufficiently clear and con-
vincing to demonstrate that the parties had agreed as a 
general proposition to exchange land for the payment due 
under the Trust Deed Note, it still cannot be concluded that 
the necessary meeting of the minds occurred, because the 
agreement would still be too indefinite to enforce. Valcare 
v. Bitters, 362 P.2d 427, 428 (Utah 1961). Such an "agree-
ment" leaves many material questions unanswered such as 
what property JBC was to accept in payment for the amount 
of the Note or the standard by which an appropriate property 
would be designated. 
Further, as Harward apparently did not own property 
he proposed to trade, what form was the "trade" to take--a 
commission to be deducted from the sales price or a purchase 
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of property by Harward with resale to JBC at a higher price 
to cover the amount of the Note? None of these significant 
questions is answerable from the testimony and other evidence 
before the court, and for that reason alone it must conclude 
that no meeting of the minds took place and no reformation of 
the Trust Deed Note is appropriate or possible. 
2. There Was Insufficient Evidence of In-
equitable Conduct on the Part of JBC to 
Justify Reformation of the Trust Deed Note. 
The courts of Utah require "clear and convincing" evi-
dence to justify reformation of a written instrument on the 
grounds of fraud or inequitable conduct as well as on grounds 
of mutual mistake. Weight v. Bailey, supra at 903. 
Harward argues in his Brief at Point VII that if there 
was no mutual mistake justifying reformation, then there 
was inequitable conduct by JBC in encouraging Harward to 
spend time and effort in locating land for JBC under the 
false impression that he need not pay money in satisfaction 
of the Trust Deed Note when JBC secretly intended not to 
perform if such land was located. Harward cites no portion 
of the record for this proposition because there is no sup-
port for it in the record. 
The facts previously discussed clearly contradict any 
claim of inequitable conduct on the part of JBC and there 
is thus no justification for reformation on that ground. 
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3. There Was Insufficient Evidence to Estep 
JBC from Denying an Agreement to Accept 
Property in Sole Payment of the Trust 
Deed Note. 
Accepting the elements of equitable estoppel set forth 
in Celebrity Club, Inc. v. Utah Liquor Control Comm., 602 
P.2d 689 (Utah 1979), as stated in the Harward Brief at 
86, there is simply insufficient clear and convincing evi-
dence in the record to support Harward's claim that JBC is 
estopped to deny it agreed to accept a property trade in 
lieu of cash payment of the Trust Deed Note: 
(a) JBC made no statement nor took any action 
inconsistent with the requirements that the Note be satis-
fied in money. The evidence before the court shows that 
JBC agred to make some sort of property exchange as an ac-
commodation to Harward but not that it was required to do 
so. 
(b) Harward's actions were not taken in reliance 
on any representation by JBC that it would take only prop-
erty in satisfaction of the Note. Harward claims that in 
reliance on JBC's statments and acts he failed to pay money 
on the Trust Deed Note, thus allowing it to go into default. 
There is no evidence in the record that Harward had the money 
to pay the Note when due. In fact, JBC's agreement to take 
a property exchange after the Note's due date was shown to 
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be an accommodation to Harward because he did not have the 
money to pay the Note. 
Harward further claims that in reliance on JBC he spent 
time and effort in seeking property for JBC he would not 
otherwise have expended. This claim is unsupportable. Har-
ward was a realtor who dealt in such properties for a living. 
In dealing ith JBC he was pursuing his normal line of work 
and expected to get a commission on any deal he made for 
them. The fact that his commission on such a deal would 
go to pay the Note was a benefit to Harward and is really 
not relevant in any event. 
(c) Any injury to Harward is a result of his fail-
ure to abide by the terms of the Trust Deed Note and is not 
due to any action of JBC. Rather than foreclose the Trust 
Deed when the due date had passed without payment, JBC con-
tinued to accommodate Harward by seeking a property deal 
which would allow satisfaction of the Note. There was no 
evidence that they acted in bad faith in any potential land 
deal; on the contrary, they spent much fruitless time and 
effort in seekino a deal which would involve Harward. 
Harward never paid the Note and now asks the court to 
rule that JBC's forebearance and cooperation with him through-
out their business relationship should bar JBC from seeking 
the money which is due it by a remedy which it bargained 
-40-Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
for in good faith, foreclosure of the trust deed. Harward's 
position itself is inequitable and this court should uphold 
the judgment of the trial court and allow the trustee's sale 
to go forward as ordered. 
CONCLUSION 
Harward has attacked those portions of the judgment 
of the court against him and in favor of JBC on his claims 
that JBC breached implied warranties of habitability and 
workmanship, that JBC committed fraud in allegedly failing 
to disclose to Harward that subdivision improvements had 
not been approved by Orem City, and that the Trust Deed Note 
between Harward and JBC should be reformed to reflect an 
agreement that JBC take only property in payment of the Note, 
and be estopped from denying that agreement. However, the 
judgment of the trial court is adequately supported by find-
ings of fact and those findings of fact have substantial 
support in the record. Therefore, Harward's contentions 
on this appeal must be denied, and the judgment of the trial 
court upheld. ~ 
Dated this~ day of May, 1981. 
By 
& MARTINEAU 
~--==--s:;;_-=-----~~-=-__.a--~~~~~ 
A. Dennis Norton 
Stephen Roth 
Attorneys for Respondent 
Jensen Bros. Construction Co. 
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I hereby certify that I delivered two copies of the 
foregoing document to William Bradford, attorney for Taylor 
National, Inc. this /5-r-day 
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